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Abstract
Using estimates of earnings functions in Ghana, this paper exam-
ines patterns of labor market segmentation with regard to formal and
informal employment. Persistent earnings differentials are used as in-
dicators of limited mobility across segments of the employed labor
force. We find evidence of labor market segmentation between formal
and informal employment and between different categories of infor-
mal employment which cannot be fully explained by human capital,
physical asset, or credit market variables. We argue that dualist labor
market models may not be appropriate for understanding employ-
ment dynamics in all circumstances and an approach that recognizes
the multi-segmented character of labor markets may be preferable.
JEL Classification: J21, J30, O17, O55.
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1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that labor markets and employment dynamics in
developing countries differ from those in advanced industrialized economies.
Specifically, theories of employment dynamics in developing countries fre-
quently posit a dual labor market composed of two distinct sectors - a formal
(or modern) sector and an informal (or traditional) sector. These divisions
characterize Ghana’s labor market, in which a small number of people work
in formal employment and the vast majority work in agricultural or non-farm
informal activities. Using empirical analysis of employment in Ghana, this
paper argues that traditional dualist models of the labor market may not be
appropriate for understanding employment dynamics. Instead, an approach
that recognizes the multi-segmented character of labor markets is preferred.
1
1 INTRODUCTION
The precise formulation of dual labor markets varies from application
to application, but the essence of dual labor market models remains fairly
consistent. Labor markets in the formal sector are characterized by some
form of wage rigidity - either due to explicit government interventions (e.g.
social protections such as minimum wage legislation), the bargaining power
of workers’ organizations, or other imperfections in the formal wage labor
market - in which wages remain above the market clearing level1. Wage in-
flexibility creates a situation in which formal employment opportunities are
rationed. Individuals who are denied access to employment in the formal
sector work in remunerative activities in the informal sector, in which reg-
ulatory or distributive distortions are absent. Dual labor market theories
have a rich history and have been used to shed light on a range of issues, in-
cluding migration, open unemployment, economic growth, industrialization,
employment subsidies, and distributive outcomes (Lewis [15]; Fei and Ranis
[8]; Todaro [25] ; Harris and Todaro [11]; Stiglitz [22][23]; Bourguignon [3]).
In these approaches to the dual nature of labor markets, the “informal”
or “traditional” sector is characterized as a homogenous residual, with no
barriers to entry, no constraints on mobility, and no rationing of opportu-
nities. However, other studies have suggested that informal labor markets
are segmented, worker mobility is constrained and that opportunities in the
informal economy may be rationed (Chen et al. [5]; Meagher [17]; Pahl [19];
Hart [12]). Fields [9] suggests that, in certain cases, it may be desirable to
elaborate dual labor market models by recognizing the duality that may be
apparent in the informal economy itself. The policy implications are poten-
tially significant. Traditional dual labor market theories frequently stress
the regulatory and institutional distortions in the formal wage labor market,
often arguing for less regulation and greater flexibility. However, if barriers
to opportunity and constraints on mobility exist in the informal economy,
then a failure to address these factors may perpetuate inequalities, limit
improvements in living standards, and fail to address endemic poverty and
deprivation, even if the efficiency of formal labor markets were improved.
A number of factors could explain observed patterns of segmentation in
informal employment. For example, differences in earnings may simply reflect
returns to human capital and the distribution of skills in the workforce. Alter-
natively, other constraints - outside of the labor market - may limit mobility
and produce employment patterns in which otherwise equivalent workers re-
ceive different earnings for an hour’s work. For example, imperfections in
1For example, Stiglitz [22] develops a model in which replacing workers is costly, thereby
creating an incentive to keep wages above the market clearing level in order to reduce
turnover.
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credit markets could create patterns of employment segmentation if the lack
of credit produces cash flow problems or prevents individuals from undertak-
ing investments that would raise average earnings. An unequal distribution
of assets, together with imperfect credit markets, can yield an unequal dis-
tribution of income-earning opportunities. Analysts have also stressed the
role of social capital, for example kinship networks, in determining access to
opportunities within the informal economy (Collier and Garg [6]; Hart [12]).
This paper investigates patterns of labor market segmentation in Ghana.
As in dual labor market approaches, employment is divided into formal and
informal categories. However, this basic dichotomy is complicated by in-
cluding divisions based on employment status (wage- and self-employment),
sector (agricultural and non-agricultural), and the worker’s sex. We esti-
mate earnings functions for employed individuals in Ghana using household
survey data. Under conditions of complete labor mobility, hourly earnings
should be equal across types of employment, controlling for individual char-
acteristics such as experience and education. In contrast, persistent earnings
differentials are one indication of barriers to employment mobility, between
the formal and informal economy, but also between types of informal em-
ployment.
2 Employment in Ghana
Data from the fourth round (1998/99) of the Ghana Living Standards Sur-
vey (GLSS 4) were used in the study. The data, covering 5, 998 households,
are representative at the national and regional level. Three other national
living standard surveys had been administered in Ghana prior to the GLSS
4. A special focus on employment, labor force characteristics, and employ-
ment income were integrated into the fourth round of the GLSS, making
it a particularly suitable data set for the current study 2. Only individual
adults-fifteen years of age and older-who reported that they were employed
during the past seven days were included in the analysis.
Data on employment earnings and types of employment feature promi-
nently in the current study and merit additional attention. Average hourly
earnings were used as the measure of employment earnings, defined as total
weekly income from employment divided by total hours of work per week3.
2A fifth round of the GLSS is underway at the time of writing.
3Respondents could report earnings and hours of work on a daily, weekly, fortnightly,
monthly, or annual basis. These responses were converted into average weekly earnings
and hours of work before calculating average hourly earnings. Individuals who reported
working more than 125 hours per week were dropped from the sample.
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The GLSS 4 allows for multiple estimates of self-employment income. How-
ever, the reliability of income estimates derived from reported gross revenues
less operating expenses are questionable (for a discussion of the problems see
[7]. Instead, direct reported net earnings from a given self-employment ac-
tivity is used. The market value of goods produced through self-employment
activities but consumed at home is imputed and added to self-employment
income. In addition, the monetary value of in-kind payments is included in
estimates of employment earnings.
Self-employment earnings for family enterprises with unpaid family labor
present a particular challenge for estimating individual hourly earnings. The
estimates of self-employment earnings attribute all earnings from a given fam-
ily enterprise to a single individual, although other family members4 worked
in the enterprise. Using the earnings and hours work as they are reported
would overstate the hourly earnings of the individual to which all earnings
were attributed. To correct for this potential bias, total self-employment
income from the family enterprise is divided by total hours worked on the
enterprise, including the hours worked by unpaid family members. This av-
erage hourly rate is then multiplied by each individual’s working hours to
re-estimate each individual’s self-employment income. This technique im-
putes earnings to unpaid family workers - an estimate of the unpaid worker’s
contribution to employment income.
The indicators for type of employment used in this study classified em-
ployment along three dimensions: employment status (wage employment
or self-employment, including own-account workers), formality of the em-
ployment activity (formal or informal), and sector (agricultural v. non-
agricultural, public v. private). Individuals were classified based on their
primary job5. The methods chosen for differentiating informal employment
from formal employment were adapted from the recommendations of the
17th International Conference of Labor Statisticians [14]. The 17th ICLS
suggested that the definition of informal employment should include both (1)
employment in informal enterprises (including all forms of self-employment)
and (2) wage employment in informal jobs outside of informal enterprises.
This general approach to defining informal employment was applied in
the current study as follows. Self-employed individuals were considered to
be operating informally if their enterprise was not registered with any gov-
4This technique makes the implicit simplifying assumption that productivity of all
workers, including unpaid family members, is identical. The GLSS 4 does not have enough
information to calculate the precise productivity differential between different workers in
each family enterprise.
5Approximately one third of all employed individuals in the GLSS 4 survey had multiple
jobs.
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ernment agency. Wage workers were considered to be working informally
if they did not have any kind of employment contract6. In addition, self-
employed workers were further divided into own-account workers and other
self-employed7. By defining informal employment based on characteristics
of the enterprise or employment relationship, we avoid problems of selection
bias associated with definitions of informality based on income or earnings
(see, for example, [13]).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the data used in this study.
Agricultural employment accounts for just over 50 percent of total employ-
ment in Ghana. Wage employment, both formal and informal, is relatively
uncommon, accounting for 16 percent of total employment8. In particular,
very few women are employed as wage employees. The most important form
of employment for women is employment as non-agricultural informal own-
account workers.
Table 1: Distribution of employment by sex and
employment type (Ghana, 1998/9).
Men Women
Obs. Percent Obs. Percent
1. Non-Agricultural Formal Pri-
vate Wage Employment
127 3.7 28 1.2
Continued on next page
6An alternative criterion used to distinguish formal from informal jobs is whether a
worker is covered by a set of basic social protections (Hussmanns [14]). We chose to use
legal/regulatory criteria in this study to distinguish formal from informal employment,
since similar distinctions would then be used for both the self-employed and wage workers.
We explored an alternative definition of informal wage employment that classified a worker
as informal if they lacked paid leave and an employer-provided pension. Interestingly,
although the same (rather small, 3.7%) proportion of individuals fall under each definition
of formal employment, the overlap is not perfect (2.9% of the individuals have both a
contract and social protections, i.e. roughly 80% overlap). The regression results, discussed
in the next section, were not dramatically altered by the choice of definition.
7Presumably, employers would constitute the “other” self-employed. However, the
GLSS 4 questionnaire is ambiguous on the precise employment status of individuals who
report being self employed but do not report being own account workers. Therefore, some
caution is needed in interpreting this category.
8According to Mazumdar [16], most African countries follow this pattern. His calcula-
tions show that in 1990 the share of wage employment in the Ghananian labor force was
only 3.78 percent. The estimated African average (18 countries) was 9.10 percent. Cana-
garajah and Thomas [4] use the three first rounds of the GLSS (1987, 1988 and 1991) to
document the decline in the share of wage labor and the increasing absorption of workers
into the informal sector.
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Men Women
Obs. Percent Obs. Percent
2. Public Formal Wage Employ-
ment
301 9.4 120 3.4
3. Agricultural Formal Wage Em-
ployment
21 0.6 4 0.1
4. Non-Agricultural Registered
Self-employed
154 4.4 225 6.5
5. Non-Agricultural Unregistered
Self-employed, Not Own-Account
59 1.9 58 1.8
6. Non-Agricultural Unregistered
Self-employed Own-Account
481 15.4 1537 45.1
7. Non-Agricultural Informal Pri-
vate Wage Employment
237 7.5 85 3.0
8. Public Informal Wage Employ-
ment
74 2.0 24 0.6
9. Agricultural Registered Self-
employed
105 2.8 55 1.4
10. Agricultural Unregistered
Self-employed
1926 50.1 1472 36.7
11. Agricultural Informal Wage
Employment
75 2.3 9 0.3
Total 3560 100.00 3617 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the GLSS 4 (see text).
Table 2 presents estimates of average hourly earnings and average weekly
hours for men and women by type of employment. Average earnings differ
significantly across the various categories of employment. Earnings are lowest
for agricultural workers and informal non-agricultural workers. As predicted
by dual labor market theories, average hourly earnings are significantly higher
for formal wage employment. Hours of work are shortest in agricultural and
public employment, and are longest in private wage employment and non-
agricultural self-employment. Women earn less than men on average and
work slightly fewer hours9.
The significant differences in earning across types of employment and be-
tween men and women suggest that labor markets could be segmented in
9Only in formal agricultural wage employment are women’s hourly earnings higher than
men’s. However, in this category of employment, women’s average earnings are based on
only four observations and are not statistically reliable.
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Table 2: Mean Hourly Earnings (cedis) and
Weekly Hours by Sex and Employment Type
(Ghana, 1998/9).
Men Women
Average
Hourly
Earnings
Average
Weekly
Hours
Average
Hourly
Earnings
Average
Weekly
Hours
Mean Std
Dev
Mean Std
Dev
Mean Std
Dev
Mean Std
Dev
1. Non-Agricultural
Formal Private Wage
Employment
1,499.0 168.8 50.3 2.6 951.2 141.0 47.2 3.0
2. Public Formal Wage
Employment
1,353.3 99.9 47.3 1.5 1,096.2 80.9 42.9 2.2
3. Agricultural Formal
Wage Employment
1,054.3 212.2 43.1 1.6 1,552.2 556.3 35.1 6.3
4. Non-Agricultural
Registered Self-
employed
1,087.2 145.4 61.5 2.2 555.9 48.6 59.2 2.3
5. Non-Agricultural
Unregistered Self-
employed, Not Own-
Account
953.2 182.6 58.8 3.5 595.7 158.2 58.1 4.6
6. Non-Agricultural
Unregistered Self-
employed Own-
Account
694.0 48.4 58.5 1.3 579.5 29.1 53.8 0.8
7. Non-Agricultural
Informal Private Wage
Employment
761.2 77.7 59.4 2.0 513.3 127.3 60.0 3.8
8. Public Informal
Wage Employment
1,340.8 174.3 54.3 3.2 784.0 109.2 43.6 4.0
9. Agricultural Regis-
tered Self-employed
590.1 70.9 58.2 3.2 438.0 89.4 45.9 3.6
10. Agricultural
Unregistered Self-
employed
511.8 59.3 40.1 0.6 332.2 14.9 36.5 0.6
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Men Women
Average
Hourly
Earnings
Average
Weekly
Hours
Average
Hourly
Earnings
Average
Weekly
Hours
Mean Std
Dev
Mean Std
Dev
Mean Std
Dev
Mean Std
Dev
11. Agricultural Infor-
mal Wage Employment
465.9 82.8 52.6 2.8 429.9 87.4 36.3 7.3
Total 728.4 35.1 47.8 0.5 507.8 16.1 47.4 0.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the GLSS 4 (see text)
Ghana. However, the patterns observed in the simple tabulations presented
in Tables 1 and 2 could be driven by differences among individual workers and
not by structural characteristics of the Ghanaian labor market. Specifically,
inequality in earnings is not sufficient for demonstrating labor market seg-
mentation. What is needed is evidence of barriers to labor market mobility
which prevent some individuals from taking advantage of employment oppor-
tunities available to others with similar characteristics [10]. A more rigorous
analysis—in which we control for individual characteristics—can better test
for the existence of segmented labor markets.
3 Regression Results
Earnings equations were estimated using data from the GLSS 4. Following
the extensive literature beginning with Mincer [18], we used a log-linear spec-
ification with hourly earnings as a dependent variable. The basic model can
be expressed as:
ln(hour earnhh,pid) = α ·Xhh + β · Yhh,pid + hh,pid
where X is a set of household specific variables, Y are the covariates of
earnings at the individual level and the last term correspond to a random
error. All estimates where obtained using weighted ordinary least squares10.
Definitions of the complete set of variables used are presented in Table 3.
Our specification includes a set of education and literacy indicators. Ghana’s
educational system is quite complex (an individual’s education could com-
prise up to 6 stages). It also has gone through a substantial reform recently.
10The weights are those provided by the Ghanaian Statistical Office and represent the
inverse of the probability of selection in each cluster.
8
3 REGRESSION RESULTS
Our indicators attempt to signal what could be roughly considered primary,
secondary and higher education levels. “Koranic stage” and courses other
than the official ones were assumed not to contribute towards human capital
formation. Indicators of reading ability—both for English and any Ghanaian
language—and a numeracy variable were also included to control for human
capital.
One reason, among other factors, why women may have lower earnings is
that they are disproportionately responsible for unpaid, non-market activi-
ties such as taking care of children. Therefore, a variable controlling for the
presence of young children (less than 7 years old) in the household was in-
cluded. Because women must take responsibility for these non-remunerative
activities, their ability to obtain and keep employment is reduced thereby
causing lower earnings even after controlling for education, type of employ-
ment, and similar factors. Thus, one would expect a significant and negative
estimate for the ‘presence of a child’ dummy, if the responsibility for child-
care argument were the primary determinant or women’s disadvantage in
the Ghanaian labor market. Also, we would expect the ‘female’ indicator to
either become insignificant or, at least, have an effect of smaller magnitude
once the presence of a child is controlled for.
Controls for an individual’s potential access to credit were included in the
analysis. Specifically, dummy variables indicating whether the individual had
been successful in obtaining credit in the past were used. If credit rationing
and imperfect access to credit were responsible for observed differences in
earnings, we would expect these variables to pick up the effect.
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the main regression results. As with many
other earnings equations, the analysis showed workers obtain higher earnings
as they grow older, with decreasing marginal returns to age. Interestingly,
women’s earnings fall significantly below those of men, after controlling for
age, education, type of employment, and access to credit.
The literature linking schooling and earnings is vast. Starting with the
model by Becker [2] and Schultz [21] education has been seen as an invest-
ment in human capital. Accordingly, the estimates corresponding to the level
of education in Mincerian equations have been interpreted as providing prox-
ies for a rate of return. The data in the GLSS show mixed evidence regarding
returns to education. On the one hand, primary education and literacy in
a Ghanaian language were statistically insignificant throughout the analysis.
On the other hand, having completed higher levels education raised earn-
ings. Numeracy-having the ability to perform written calculations-increased
9
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Table 3: Variable Definition
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev.
Age Age in years 40.82 0.19
Age2 Age squared/1000 1.86 0.02
Female Female dummy 0.50 0.01
Primary Primary education completed 0.45 0.01
Post-primary Secondary or Higher education
completed
0.17 0.01
Math Ability to perform written cal-
culations
0.56 0.01
Ghanaian lit Literacy in any Ghanaian Lan-
guage
0.43 0.01
English lit Literacy in English 0.46 0.01
Akan Akan ethnic group indicator 0.52 0.01
Loc 1 Accra (base category) 0.09 0.01
Loc 2 Urban location, other than Ac-
cra
0.24 0.01
Loc 3 Rural location, coastal 0.16 0.01
Loc 4 Rural location, forest 0.34 0.01
Loc 5 Rural location, savannah 0.16 0.01
Empstat1 Non-Agricultural Formal Pri-
vate Wage Employment (base
category)
0.02 < 0.01
Empstat2 Public Formal Wage Employ-
ment
0.06 < 0.01
Empstat3 Agricultural Formal Wage Em-
ployment
< 0.01 < 0.01
Empstat4 Non-Agricultural Registered
Self-employed
0.05 < 0.01
Empstat5 Non-Agricultural Unregis-
tered Self-employed, Not
Own-Account
0.02 < 0.01
Empstat6 Non-Agricultural Unregistered
Self-employed Own-Account
0.30 0.01
Empstat7 Non-Agricultural Informal Pri-
vate Wage Employment
0.05 < 0.01
Empstat8 Public Informal Wage Employ-
ment
0.01 < 0.01
Continued on next page
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Table 3 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev.
Empstat9 Agricultural Registered Self-
employed
0.02 < 0.01
Empstat10 Agricultural Unregistered Self-
employed
0.44 0.01
Empstat11 Agricultural Informal Wage
Employment
0.01 < 0.01
Own land Household member owns a plot
of land somewhere
0.31 0.01
Agric assets Value of agricultural assets
owned by household (thou-
sands of cedis)
368.55 65.44
Credit granted Applied for credit to financial
institution with positive result
0.02 < 0.01
Credit rejected Applied for credit to financial
institution with negative result
0.03 < 0.01
Non-Ag assets Value of assets of enterprises
owned by household members
(thousands of cedis)
724.23 114.86
Pchild Presence of any children (< 7)
in household
0.57 0.01
remuneration levels as well11.
Location proved to be an important factor affecting earnings in Ghana,
with people outside the main city (Accra) earning significantly less, ceteris
paribus. Individuals living in households that owned a plot of land also
experience higher earnings. In addition, having been granted credit by a
financial institution led to higher earnings for those living in a household
where a firm was being operated. Some of the other controls did not turn
out to have a statistically significant effect on earnings. For example, the
individual’s ethnicity seems not to be relevant in explaining labor income
in Ghana. Finally, including the ’presence of child’ flag has neither of the
expected effects described above. The estimate comes out insignificant and
the ‘female effect’ retains the same importance.
The structure of earnings in Ghana responds strongly to the indicators of
type of employment. As discussed previously, these indicators take into ac-
11The initial specification also included a set of indicators for both parents’ education
level. We classified educational attainment into three categories: primary, secondary and
higher. Out of the six educational indicators only one came out weakly significant.
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Table 4: Earnings Equation Estimation Results
(1) (2)
Age 0.043 0.040
[0.006]** [0.006]**
Age2 -0.417 -0.419
[0.067]** [0.067]**
Female -0.258 -0.342
[0.033]** [0.031]**
Primary 0.001
[0.051]
Post-primary 0.175
[0.070]*
Ghanaian lit 0.033
[0.045]
English lit 0.047
[0.056]
Math 0.176
[0.057]**
Akan -0.021 0.009
[0.033] [0.033]
Loc 2 -0.418 -0.452
[0.056]** [0.056]**
Loc 3 -0.788 -0.862
[0.061]** [0.061]**
Loc 4 -0.460 -0.499
[0.057]** [0.057]**
Loc 5 -0.664 -0.768
[0.063]** [0.063]**
Empstat2 -0.005 0.027
[0.087] [0.090]
Empstat3 -0.127 -0.181
[0.175] [0.189]
Empstat4 -0.665 -0.744
[0.097]** [0.098]**
Empstat5 -0.584 -0.715
[0.119]** [0.119]**
Empstat6 -0.700 -0.826
[0.086]** [0.085]**
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
(1) (2)
Empstat7 -0.748 -0.849
[0.104]** [0.106]**
Empstat8 -0.143 -0.145
[0.121] [0.124]
Empstat9 -0.907 -1.053
[0.139]** [0.138]**
Empstat10 -1.092 -1.251
[0.087]** [0.085]**
Empstat11 -0.829 -1.009
[0.141]** [0.138]**
Own land 0.152 0.148
[0.033]** [0.033]**
Agric assets 7.72e-06 7.49e-06
[2.57e-06]** [2.55e-06]**
Credit granted 0.313 0.362
[0.122]** [0.121]**
Credit rejected -0.082 -0.064
[0.076] [0.076]
Non-Ag assets 4.89e-06 5.34e-06
[1.95e-06]* [2.10e-06]*
Pchild 0.049 0.038
[0.031] [0.031]
Constant 5.950 6.424
[0.168]** [0.161]**
Observations 7137 7137
R-squared 0.22 0.22
Standard errors in brackets
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%
count employment status, sector, and degree of formality12. In the estimates
presented here, the earnings of formal wage workers in the non-agricultural
private sector is the baseline for interpreting the coefficients on the other em-
ployment indicators. As expected from duality theories, employment earn-
ings in informal activities are considerably lower than those in formal ac-
tivities. The one exception is in the public sector, where the contractual
criterion of formality does not seem to have an impact on wages. Note that
the negative effects of informality and self-employment on earnings, as cap-
tured by our coefficient estimates, are far larger in absolute value than the
13
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positive effects of post-primary education or numeracy.
When the estimation was repeated removing all the human capital vari-
ables (Table 4, column 2), the coefficients on the employment indicator vari-
ables increased in magnitude suggesting that, despite the lack of statistical
significance of the coefficients on these variables in column 1, human capital
does affect earnings within employment categories and that average human
capital endowments vary on average from one type of employment to the
next. To avoid biased estimates due to the omission of relevant variables,
the human capital variables should be included in the earnings equations.
Therefore, we take the coefficient estimates from column 1 as the more reli-
able estimates13.
The estimates indicate that labor market segmentation exists beyond the
formal-informal divide. Among the various types of informal employment,
significant earnings differentials persist. Specifically, informally self-employed
in non-agricultural activities earn more than informal non-agricultural wage
workers, controlling for the various factors discussed here. The results of a
Wald test show that the coefficients on the employment indicator variables
corresponding to these two categories were statistically different at the 5%
significance level. If no barriers to mobility among informal workers exist,
then we would expect workers to move from informal wage employment to
informal self-employment until the earnings differential vanishes. The exis-
tence of a sizeable and statistically significant earnings differential between
these types of employment suggests that barriers may exist that limit entry
into informal self-employment.
One potential difficulty with this analysis is that it may not adequately
take into account the impact of multiple job holding. Remember—the em-
ployment indicators are defined at the individual level based on a person’s
primary occupation. Therefore, we estimated the same earnings equation,
but switched the unit of observation from the individual to the job. In other
words, an individual with multiple jobs would now contribute more than one
observation to the estimation process. The estimated equation now had the
form:
12We eliminated unpaid family workers from the sample, but retained the adjustment to
self-employment earnings as described in the text. Results from estimations that include
unpaid family workers do not differ significantly from those presented here and are available
from the authors.
13We broke up the sample between formal and informal workers and estimated separate
earnings equations (available on request). We found that the effect of age (a possible
proxy for experience) and post-primary education are much stronger in the formal sector.
However, the effect of numeracy was stronger for workers in the informal sector.
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ln(hour earnhh,pid,occ rank) = α ·Xhh + β · Yhh,pid + γ · Zhh,pid,occ rank +
+ δ · rankhh,pid,occ rank + hh,pid,occ rank
where hh, pid, and occ rank identify the household, the individual within
the household, and the jobs of each individual respectively. X is a vector of
household level variables (region, presence of children, etc.). Y is a vector
of individual characteristics (sex, education, ethnicity, etc.), Z is a vector
of job characteristics (non-agricultural self-employed, informal private wage
worker, etc.). Finally, rank is a set of three job ranking dummies placed in
the equation in order to allow for rank-specific shift effects in earnings.
The job-level regression suggests that the findings based on the individual-
level earnings equation (Table 5) are robust14. The job level regression anal-
ysis confirmed that employment status effects are important, and that there
seems to be segmentation in the informal sector. However, some of the vari-
ables that were significant in the previous analysis no longer seem to have
an impact on earnings. Most notably, the dummies for non-agricultural self-
employment—both with and without employees—do not show a negative
effect on earnings when the regression is run at the job level. Informal wage
employment and agricultural self-employment, on the contrary, still imply
lower earnings on average.
These regressions include three job-rank dummy variables, all of which
are strongly negative and significant. The implication is that second, third
and fourth jobs pay less on average than the main job, all other things equal.
When individuals take on additional employment activities, they diversify
into lower-paid activities where the barriers to entry are presumably lower15.
This is consistent with the existence of a segmented labor market. The
female dummy variable shows a stronger negative effect on earnings than at
the individual-level analysis. This is related to the fact that women earn
relatively less than men in secondary jobs16. The opposite seems to be true
for those individuals who identify themselves as belonging to the Akan ethnic
group (this variable was insignificant in the individual-level regressions).
14The type of employment indicators were narrowed in number by ignoring the distinc-
tion between registered and unregistered self-employed. Since registration is determined
at the household level, including this distinction in the job level analysis makes little sense.
On the contrary, contractual formality is determined on a job-by-job basis.
15For example, the secondary employment activity of the vast majority of non-
agricultural workers (both formal and informal) with multiple job holdings is self-
employment in agriculture. However, the majority of individuals with multiple job-
holdings who report self-employment in agriculture as their primary occupation work as
non-agricultural own-account workers in their second occupation.
16Jobs other than the main one.
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Table 5: Multiple Jobs Earnings Equation Estima-
tion Results
(1) (2)
Age 0.067 0.066
[0.008]** [0.008]**
Age2 -0.613 -0.621
[0.084]** [0.082]**
Female -0.563 -0.639
[0.045]** [0.042]**
Primary -0.149
[0.067]*
Post-primary 0.022
[0.093]
Ghanaian Lit 0.026
[0.061]
English Lit 0.079
[0.074]
Math 0.230
[0.076]**
Loc 2 -0.434 -0.471
[0.063]** [0.063]**
Loc 3 -0.592 -0.684
[0.073]** [0.071]**
Loc 4 -0.155 -0.219
[0.067]* [0.066]**
Loc 5 -0.172 -0.283
[0.079]* [0.077]**
Akan 0.101 0.113
[0.043]* [0.043]**
Empstat2 0.100 0.171
[0.120] [0.120]
Empstat3 -0.147 -0.153
[0.193] [0.202]
Empstat5 (includes registered self-employed) -0.284 -0.338
[0.156] [0.158]*
Empstat6 (includes registered self-employed) -0.129 -0.205
[0.115] [0.114]
Empstat7 -0.552 -0.599
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
(1) (2)
[0.125]** [0.126]**
Empstat8 -0.022 0.010
[0.140] [0.142]
Empstat9 (registered and unregistered) -1.471 -1.552
[0.120]** [0.119]**
Empstat11 -0.649 -0.746
[0.265]* [0.265]**
Land Ownership 0.265 0.264
[0.047]** [0.047]**
Ag Assets -8.25e-06 -8.78e-06
[5.39e-06] [5.46e-06]
Credit granted 0.398 0.464
[0.162]* [0.163]**
Credit rejected -0.196 -0.172
[0.118] [0.118]
Non-Ag assets 2.92e-06 3.53e-06
[1.67e-06] [1.81e-06]
Second Job -1.414 -1.403
[0.062]** [0.062]**
Third Job -1.176 -1.184
[0.151]** [0.155]**
Fourth Job -1.266 -1.210
[0.631]* [0.679]
Constant 5.215 5.543
[0.218]** [0.205]**
Observations 9807 9807
R-squared 0.30 0.30
Standard errors in brackets
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%
4 Discussion
The findings presented here confirm the predictions of dual labor market the-
ories in Ghana: earnings in informal employment are lower than earnings in
formal employment, controlling for a range of relevant variables. However,
our results also suggest that patterns of segmentation are more complex than
a simple two-sector model would predict. Specifically, there is evidence of
segmentation within non-agricultural informal employment in Ghana, char-
17
4 DISCUSSION
acterized by barriers to entry to informal self-employment. Moreover, limita-
tions on mobility across different types of employment are not fully explained
by human capital, physical asset, or credit market variables. Theoretical
approaches that treat informal employment as a residual category with no
barriers to mobility between different types of informal employment are in-
appropriate in the case of Ghana.
In addition, we found that women’s earnings were consistently lower
than men’s after controlling for human capital, age, location, and type of
employment. This finding holds true for both wage employment and self-
employment. Labor market discrimination is often used to explain gender-
based differences in wage employment. However, these results suggest that
gender-based disadvantages in Ghana’s labor markets extend to forms of em-
ployment without an employer/employee relationship. These results support
the argument that labor markets in developing countries may be segmented
in important ways that are not captured by dual labor market approaches.
This study says little about the factors that determine the type of labor
market segmentation we find in the case of Ghana. As mentioned earlier,
other studies of employment in Ghana suggest that social capital (e.g. kinship
networks and information networks) may be important in determining wage
differentials and access to employment opportunities (Barr and Oduro [1];
Collier and Garg [6]; Hart [12]). Similarly, social norms governing women’s
role in the economy may underpin observed patterns of gender segmenta-
tion. More research is needed to identify the factors behind patterns of labor
market segmentation in Ghana and to develop appropriate policy responses.
The analysis presented here suggests that improved access to education
and credit markets should help to improve labor market mobility among
working Ghanaians, but will not eliminate the factors behind labor market
segmentation. Others have reached similar conclusions with regard to the
role of human capital in Ghana (Sackey [20]; Teal [24]). Specifically, non-
linearities in the returns to education have been found in other studies, a
result that is consistent with the positive effect of post-primary education
on earnings in the analysis presented here [24]. However, our results suggest
that improving access to education will have a limited effect in equalizing
employment opportunities in Ghana.
This research does support the recommendations of some researchers to
move beyond duality theory and to analyze employment in developing coun-
tries in terms of “multi-segmented labor market” (Chen, et al. [5]). For
countries like Ghana, such an approach would improve our understanding
of employment dynamics and ultimately improve the effectiveness of labor
market policies.
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